THE AVAILABILITY OF CRIMINAL JURY TRIALS
UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENTJThe Supreme Court's deepening concern for procedural safeguards'
has included concern for the availability of criminal jury trials. In a
line of cases beginning with Duncan v. Kahanamoku2 and running
through Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez3 and United States v. Barnett,4
the Court has shown a strong inclination to compel criminal jury trials in
fringe areas of the criminal process previously thought to be free from
any such constitutional directive.
Disconcertingly, the Court has failed to develop standards for imposing
criminal jury trials in these new areas. Neither the old cases, which are
now indirectly rejected, nor the modern cases, which point toward expansion, present a coherent view of the criminal jury requirement. This
comment will explore the ideas about juries that can be gathered from
the cases and attempt to develop a workable theory for the availability of
criminal jury trials. Fundamental to this analysis is recognition of the
tension between the individual's interest in a jury trial and government's
interest in simpler procedures. 5
I.

A criminal jury trial is required by the sixth amendment in "all
criminal prosecutions." 6 Until recently, this phrase carried a most
t Chester Kamin, third year student at the University of Chicago Law School. For a
related discussion of the Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez decision, see Comment, The
Concept of Punitive Legislation and the Sixth Amendment: A New Look at Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 290 (1964) supra.
1 E.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964);
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 363 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
(1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359
U.S. 500, 510-11 (1959).
2 327 U.S. 304 (1963).
3 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
4 376 U.S. 681 (1964).
5 Of course the government's potential interest in jury trials in ordinary criminal
cases has been recognized. Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 277 (1942); Patton v.
United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930); United States v. Igoe, 331 F.2d 766 (1964).
6 US. CoNsr. art. III, § 2, cl. 3: "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes
shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall
be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed." U.S. CONsr.
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narrow and technical meaning. Certain cases dearly criminal in other
senses of the word-criminal contempt7 and petty crimes8 for examplewere exempted from its scope, as were serious crimes committed or tried
under special circumstances-in the armed forces,9 in American possessions,10 and in American consulates. 1 Similarly exempted were fines and

forfeitures for administrative violations which were serious enough to
2
be crimes but which the legislature chose to enforce by "civil means."'
And narrow construction barred juries where the state imposed such
amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which districts shall have been previously ascertained
by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." Schick v.
United States, 195 U.S. 65, 78 (1904) holds that the term "all criminal prosecutions"
was not intended to widen the term "trial of all crimes," that the purpose of the
sixth amendment was solely to guarantee certain features of jury trials. For a history
of the sixth amendment, see Frankfurter and Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the
Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HAJuv. L. REv. 917, 969-75 (1926). For
criticism of this article, see Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers!, 26 U. CHi. L. REv.
245 (1959). As for the relationship between the sixth amendment and the fifth amendment, United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475, 480-82 (1896), makes clear that the sixth
amendment's operative words, "all criminal prosecutions," are narrower in scope than
the fifth amendment's provision against self-incrimination "in any criminal case." The
grand jury provision for "capital or otherwise infamous crimes" is, of course, narrower
than "criminal prosecution." Whether the sixth amendment jury requirement now
applies to state as well as federal proceedings is outside the scope of this comment. Cf.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
7 United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681, 694 n.12 (1964); Green v. United States, 356
U.S. 165 (1958); In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).

8 District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); District of Columbia v.
Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904); Callan v. Wilson,
127 U.S. 540 (1888).
9 Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1 (1920); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1877); Dynes
v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 65 (1857).
10 Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 215-216 (1903). Cf. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S.
244, 270-271, 280-281 (1901) (revenue power in territories).
11 In re De Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 465 (1890).
12 Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938) (double jeopardy); Oceanic Steam
Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909); Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S.
103, 107-108 (1909) (and cases cited at 107-08) (directed verdict against defendant);
United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475, 481 (1896) (confrontation of witnesses); Passavant v.
United States, 148 U.S. 214, 221-222 (1893); Bartlett v. Kane, 57 U.S. 263 (1853); United
States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. 297 (1796); Olshausen v. CIR, 273 F.2d 23 (1960). Cf.
License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. 462 (1866). But cf. Union Ins. Co. v. United States, 73 U.S.
759 (1867) (civil jury for federal forfeiture on land); Regal Drug Corp. v. Wardell, 260
U.S. 386 (1922); United States v. White, 106 U.S. 561 (1883) (civil jury to revoke land
patent for fraud); Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454 (1868). See also Van Oster v. Kansas,
272 U.S. 465, 469 (1926) (no jury required for state forfeiture).

1965]

CRIMINAL JURY TRIALS

disabilities for wrongdoing as loss of licenses,' 3 loss of right to receive
mail,' 4 loss of employment, 15 loss of child custody,' 6 protective custody
of juveniles, 17 denaturalization,' 8 and deportation. 19
The many cases rigidly confining the sixth amendment were decided
on a number of different theories. Criminal contempts could be punished
without jury, it was said, because of powers implied "to our courts of
justice, from the nature of their institution." 20 Offenses committed in
the military were triable without jury because they were within the
jurisdiction of courts-martial, which derived power under article I, section 8 and article II, section 2 and were "independent" of requirements
for article III courts.21 Offenses overseas could be tried in American consulates without a jury because juries were not one of the "fundamental"
protections of the Constitution which extended overseas. 22 Fines for
administrative violations could be collected in court without a criminal
jury trial 23because the United States in these cases was merely a
"creditor.1 Admiralty forfeitures for crimes were enforceable without
juries because they were "civil causes in admiralty." 24 Aliens could be
deported for wrongdoing with no jury trial because deportation was a
matter of "regulating" the conditions of residence, not of "punishing"
13 Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882) (disbarment); Board of Trade v. Wallace, 67
F.2d 402, 407 (1933) (commodity market suspensions); Farmer's Livestock Commission
Co. v. United States, 54 F.2d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1931); FCC v. American Broadcasting
Co., 110 F. Supp. 374, aff'd, 347 U.S. 284 (1953) (broadcasting license).
14 Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U.S. 178, 191-192 (1948).
15 Angilly v. United States, 199 F.2d 642, 644 (2d Cir. 1952) (A. Hand, J.).
16 In re Lambert, 203 F.2d 607, 609-10 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
'7 Cf. United States ex rel. Yonick v. Briggs, 266 Fed. 434 (W.D. Pa. 1920) (state
proceedings); Ex parte Januszewski, 196 Fed. 123, 127, 131 (S.D. Ohio 1911) (stato
proceedings).
18 Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9 (1913) (equity suit).
19 Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591
(1913); Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272 (1912); Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S.
227 (1912); United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904); accord, Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893); cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 447 (1944); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922); Wong Wing v. United States,
163 U.S. 228 (1896).
20 Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1873); Ex parte Kearney, 20 U.S. 38, 43-44
(1822); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812).
21 Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 65, 79 (1857).
22 In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 465 (1890).
23 Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 107-08 (1909). Some fines could constitutionally be collected without any court proceeding at all, by application of sanctions
already in the hands of the administrator. Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan,
214 U.S. 320 (1909). These cases were used to uphold license suspensions imposed without any judicial intervention. See cases cited note 13 supra.
24 United States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. 297, 301 (1796).
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Petty crimes could be punished with no jury because the Con-

stitution incorporates such common-law usages.2 6

But the Supreme Court never developed a general theory that could
be used to decide all sixth amendment claims to criminal jury trials.
Under the sway of rigid concepts and historical practice, it dealt with
each area of decision in utter isolation. Thus as the post-World War II
Court moved to enlarge the constitutional domain of the criminal jury,
it was faced with the necessity of developing a theory to guide the expansion. The old cases provided almost nothing to go on.
II.
Although faced with the need to articulate guidelines for its expansion
of the jury requirement, the Court has failed, iii consummate tradition, to
do so. The cases show, however, that because the Court has come to
regard the criminal jury trial as a fundamental constitutional safeguard,
historical barriers to the use of juries are in jeopardy.2 7
The expansion began in 1946 with the first of several cases restricting
the criminal jurisdiction of military tribunals.2 8 Employing both statutory and constitutional techniques, the Court rejected key sixth amendment cases and magniloquently elevated juries to the top of the hierarchy
of constitutional concerns. In Duncan v. Kahanamoku29 two civilians unconnected with the military80 were tried by military commission in war25 Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275 (1912) (and cases cited therein).
26 Thus when the offense in question was punished without a jury at common law
and in colonial experience, for example, prostitution, it need not now be tried by jury.
Bailey v. United States, 98 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1938). Similarly, since prosecutions for
conspiracy and criminal libel were customarily tried by jury, the sixth amendment
requirement applies to those offenses. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888); In re Dana,
6 Fed. Cas. 1140, 1142 (No. 3554) (S.D.N.Y. 1873). Where the petty offense did not
exist before 1787, such as selling oleomargarine, the Court speculated whether such
an offense would have been prosecuted by jury had it existed. The moral gravity of
the offense and the amount of punishment prescribed were treated as the key factors.
Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904). In a later case, District of Columbia v.
Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625 (1937), the Court, in dictum, remarked that offenses too
petty for jury trial at commoft law might require.a jury now if the penalty for the
offense had grown more severe, either in absolute measurement or relative to contemporary mores.
27 A parallel movement to expand the availability of civil juries under the seventh
amendment occurred. See Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221 (1963); Dairy Queen, Inc. v.
Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510-11
(1959).
28 During the war, the Court had been much more willing to concede that military
tribunals had jurisdiction. E.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (military tribunal for
saboteurs). But cf. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
29 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
30 The Court disregarded Duncan's employment in a Navy Yard.

19651

CRIMINAL JURY TRIALS

time Hawaii for non-military crimes.31 By authority of the Act of Congress establishing the Hawaiian government, civil courts had been
replaced with military commissions during the worst of the emergency,
and certain crimes had been reserved for military trials after the courts
were reopened. The Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Black, held
that the trials were unauthorized by Congress.
The Justice sidestepped a venerable sixth amendment case, Hawaii v.
Mankichi,3 2 which held that only fundamental constitutional rights took
effect in territories like Hawaii and that conviction by a less-thanunanimous jury did not involve a fundamental right. He avoided reopening these issues by assuming that Congress in establishing the
Hawaiian government had intended to provide constitutional protection
in full force. This assumption had been argued and rejected in Mankichi,
which involved, however, somewhat different statutory language.
The Court concluded that Congress' grant of authority to convoke
military tribunals should be construed narrowly in the light of historical
Anglo-American "principles and practice." That historical standardwhich may or may not be a constitutional standard-forbade general
substitution of military tribunals for civil courts except in extreme
emergencies. The overruling of Hawaii v. Mankichi, though foreshadowed, would await another day.
The Court showed deep concern about procedural safeguards found
in courts of law but lacking in military tribunals, terming them "prized
privileges of our system of government."3 3 Yet the jury trial-so highly
touted in later cases-was scarcely mentioned, Mr. Justice Black concentrating his fire on the arbitrariness of military punishments, the
inferiority of rules of evidence and procedure, and the absence of review
either by appellate courts or by habeas corpus.3 4
In the next case limiting court-martial jurisdiction, the grounds were
also statutory but quite narrow. The question in United States ex rel.
Hirschberg v. Cooke,3 5 was whether the Navy could court-martial an
enlisted man for a crime committed during a prior enlistment. The
Court, again through Mr. Justice Black, unanimously held that Congress
had not authorized the Navy to provide for courts-martial in such situations. It stressed that Navy regulations until 1932 had not assumed
31 The crimes were embezzling stock and assault. Duncan's assault on two armed
sentries at the Navy Yard was prosecuted under military nomenclature as "violations
of military orders." 327 U.S. at 310.
82 190 U.S. 197 (1903).
33 327 U.S. at 307.
34 Id. at 309-10. Mr. Justice Murphy's concurrence mentions the jury with similar
brevity. Id. at 325.
35 336 U.S. 210 (1949).
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jurisdiction over offenses in prior enlistments and that Army regulations still carried that limitation. 6
Six years after Duncan v. Kaha'namoku the Court in Madsen v.
Kinsella37 faced another complaint that a civilian had been improperly
tried by military authorities. This time a wife accused of murdering her
serviceman husband while both were stationed in Germany had been
tried by a military commission. She objected to trial by military commission rather than by court-martial, which, she conceded, would have been
proper. The Court held that court-martial jurisdiction was not exclusive
and that the commission's exercise of jurisdiction was proper.
Justice Black alone dissented. He argued in a two-paragraph opinion
that the failure of Congress to authorize trial by commission was fatal:
Whatever may be the scope of the President's power as Commander-in-Chief of the fighting armed forces, I think that if
American citizens in present-day Germany are to be tried by the
American Government, they should be tried under laws passed
by Congress and in Courts created by Congress under its constitutional authority. 38
Once again Black's hostility to military trials was evident, but his
argument did not logically extend to curtailing courts-martial since
their legislative basis was firm. Yet he was shortly to attack courts-martial
with constitutional weapons.
This attack opened in United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles.39 Five
months after an airman had been honorably discharged from service,
military police arrested him in Pittsburgh for a murder committed in
Korea while he was still under colors. The ex-airman challenged the
arrest by habeas corpus and asked .the Court whether Congress could
establish court-martial jurisdiction over ex-servicemen who had severed
all relationship to the military without violating the constitutional
right to a jury trial in "all criminal prosecutions."
Military jurisdiction over ex-servicemen for crimes in service had never
been tested against the Constitution, probably because the statute
36 The Court rejected as unimportant the circumstance that the defendant was in
the Navy the whole time save for several hours between discharge and reenlistment,
showing concern for civilian subjection to military jurisdiction: "For if that interpretation is correct, court-martial jurisdiction would be satisfied if a sailor was merely 'in
the Navy' when the offense was committed and when brought before the court-martial,
regardless of the duration of any interim period out of the naval service .... " Moreover, said the Court, such a result would make court-martial jurisdiction "whimsical
and uncertain," for the enlistee might not reenlist or might reenlist in the Army. Only
if he reenlisted in the Navy would he be tried by court martial. "Jurisdiction to punish
rarely, if ever, rests upon such illogical and fortuitous contingencies." Id. at 213-14.
37 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
38 Id. at 372.
39 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
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authorizing jurisdiction had only recently been enacted. 40 But Kahn v.
Anderson,41 a World War I case, had approved military jurisdiction to
try a dishonorably discharged serviceman, still a military prisoner, for a
crime committed after discharge but during military custody.
Writing for a six to three majority, 42 Mr. Justice Black admitted the
authority of Kahn, but distinguished the case on its facts without analysis. The case was decided instead by reference to the "natural meaning"
of the Article I power to regulate the armed forces, 43 which "would seem
to restrict court-martial jurisdiction to persons who are actually members
44
or part of the armed forces."
Narrow construction of court-martial jurisdiction was also impelled
by the vulnerability of courts-martial to improper military pressures and
by their lack of trial by jury. Justice Black voiced the virtues of juries
with fervor:
Juries fairly chosen from different walks of life bring into the
jury box a variety of different experiences, feelings, intuitions
and habits. Such juries may reach completely different conclusions than would be reached by specialists in any single field,
including specialists in the military field. On many occasions,
fully known to the Founders of this country, jurors-plain
people-have manfully stood up in defense of liberty against the
importunities of judges and despite prevailing hysteria and prejudices. . . . Unfortunately, instances could be cited where
jurors have themselves betrayed the cause of justice by verdicts based on prejudice or pressures. In such circumstances
independent trial judges and independent appellate judges have
a most important place
under our plan since they have power to
45
set aside convictions.
40 The jurisdiction was authorized by Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 3(a),
ch. 169, 64 Stat. 109 (1950) (now 10 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1958)), which provided for courtmartial jurisdiction over ex-servicemen only for serious crimes committed in service
which no other American court had jurisdiction to punish.
41 255 U.S. 1 (1921).
42 There were two dissents, one by Mr. Justice Reed joined by Justices Burton and
Minton, and one by Minton joined by Burton.
43 Art. I, § 8, cl.14.
44 350 U.S. 11, 15 (1955).
45 Id. at 18-19. Moreover, Mr. Justice Black said, the necessary and proper clause does
not enlarge article I, § 8 to this degree. "It is impossible to think that the discipline of
the Army is going to be disrupted, its morale impaired, or its orderly process disturbed,
by giving ex-servicemen the benefit of a civilian court trial when they are actually
civilians . . . .Army discipline will not be improved by court-martialing rather than
trying by jury some civilian ex-soldiers who have been separated from the service for
months, years or perhaps decades. Consequently considerations of discipline provide

no excuse for new expansion of court-martial jurisdiction at the expense of the normal
and constitutionally preferable system of trial by jury." 350 U.S. at 22-23 (citing Dimick
v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 485-86 (1934), a civil jury case).
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Toth's generous praise of the jury could scarcely be surpassed, but it
was equalled two years later in Reid v. Covert.46 Continuing the attack
on court-martial jurisdiction, the Court held that wives accompanying
servicemen on duty abroad could not be subject to trial by court-martial
for capital crimes committed there. Mr. Justice Black, on behalf of a
plurality 47 including Warren, Douglas and Brennan, declared that the
48
case was governed by Toth, as well as by Duncan v. Kahanomoku.
The Court ignored Madsen v. Kinsella,4 9 in which five years earlier it
had tacitly approved of court-martial jurisdiction over a military
dependent. Nor did Mr. Justice Black reconcile his present opinion with
his dissenting position in Madsen that Congress had power to extend
court-martial jurisdiction to dependents. But he did face squarely cases
like Hawaii v. Mankichi,50 which postulated that only fundamental
rights of the Constitution extend overseas. He flatly rejected both the
postulate about fundamental rights and the notion that juries were not
fundamental, finding another opportunity to praise the jury:
Looming far above all other deficiencies of the military trial,
of course, is the absence of trial by jury before an independent
judge after indictment by a grand jury. 5 '
Blackstone wrote in his Commentaries: "[T]he trial by jury
ever has been, and I trust ever will be looked upon as the glory
of the English law. . . . [1]t is the most transcendent privilege
which any subject can enjoy or wish for, that he cannot be
affected wither in his property, his liberty, or his person, but by
the unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbors and equals."
Trial by jury... has served and remains one of our most vital
barriers to governmental arbitrariness. These elemental procedural safeguards were embedded in our Constitution to secure
Because of the strengths of jury trials and the weaknesses of courts-martial, "determining the scope of the constitutional power of Congress to authorize trial by courtmartial presents another instance calling for limitation to 'the least possible power
adequate to the end proposed."' 350 U.S. at 23 (citing Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 204, 230-31 (1821)).
46 354 U.S. 1 (1957). The Court had decided this case once before, 351 U.S. 487
(1956), upholding court-martial jurisdiction five to three with Frankfurter reserving
opinion. On rehearing, Harlan switched his vote, Brennan replacing Minton voted to
strike down the statute, and Whittaker replacing Reed did not participate.
47 Frankfurter and Harlan each wrote separate concurrences stressing the capital
nature of the case. Clark and Burton dissented, relying on In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453
(1890).
48 327 U.S. 804 (1946). The Court relied also on Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
49 343 U.S. 341 (1952). See text accompanying note 37 supra.

50 190 U.S. 197 (1903). See also In re Ross, 140 U.S. 43 (1891) (denying trial by jury
in American consulates abroad also expressly disapproved).
51 354 U.S. 1, 37 (1957).
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against the passing demands of expediency
their inviolateness
52
or convenience.
As the attack on court-martial jurisdiction proceeded, high praise for
the jury continued. In Lee v. Madigan53 the Court held that an ex-serviceman who had been dishonorably discharged and imprisoned by
court-martial for one offense could not be tried by court-martial for a
second crime committed in a mainland military stockade while he was
under sentence for the earlier offense. The technical question concerned
a statute which prohibited court-martial for murder in the United
States "in time of peace." The Court seemed untroubled by the similar
World War I case, Kahn v. Anderson,5 4 which had held in part that
"peace" meant peace officially declared. Though the Court in the Toth
case had given lip-service to the authority of Kahn, it now dismissed the
Kahn definition of peace as dictum and accordingly treated the question
as open. To define "peace," the Court returned to the theme of Toth
and Reid-that court-martial jurisdiction must be narrowly construed
because courts-martial are vastly inferior to jury trials. "Peace" now
meant a cessation of hostilities. While the Court explicitly rejected only
that part of Kahn which defined peace, few could think that Kahn
remained authority for the general proposition that ex-servicemen could
constitutionally be court-martialed for crimes done as military prisoners.
In Lee, as in Toth and Reid, praise for the jury was profuse, but
for the first time the author was not Mr. Justice Black but Mr. Justice
Douglas: "The most significant of these [constitutional guarantees for the
accused] is the right to trial by jury, one of the most important safeguards against tyranny which our law has designed." 55
Now the attack on court-martial jurisdiction over those not in active
service was complete, save for a mopping up action. This came a yeai
later in the form of three companion cases. In Kinsella v. United States
ex rel. Singleton, 6 the Reid case was repeated except that the dependent
52 Id.

at 9-10.

53 858 U.S. 228 (1959). Justices Harlan and Clark dissented. Justice Frankfurter took

no part.

54 255 U.S. 1 (1920). See text accompanying note 41

supra.

55 858 U.S. 228, 234 (1959).
56 261 U.S. 234 (1960). Assuming that Reid and Toth, to which he had dissented,
were right for capital cases, Justice Clark concluded that a capital-non-capital distinction could not be maintained. In Reid, Justice Clark had based his dissent on administrative necessity and the lack of feasible alternatives for disposing of the servicerelated crimes. He returned to that issue, pointing out that the number of such cases
is small and hence discipline would not be endangered. Clark also intimated as dictum
that due process may now include the right to a criminal jury trial.
Frankfurter and Harlan, true to their concurrences in Reid, dissented, saying that
in the balance of interests a non-capital case ought to be triable by court-martial.
Whittaker and Stewart concurred in the result because the dependent's status was not
one of close connection to the armed forces.
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57

was charged with a non-capital offense. Grisham v. Hagan, like Reid,
was capital, but the defendant asserting his right to a jury trial was an
American civilian employed at an overseas Army installation. McElroy v.
United States ex rel. Guagliando58 presented a non-capital variation of
Grisham. On the authority of Toth and Reid, court-martial jurisdiction
in all three cases was held to be forbidden by the Constitution.
Three years after the last court-martial cases came Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez.59 There the Court held invalid a statute which, without
providing for jury trial, denationalized citizens who left the country to
evade the draft. Since loss of citizenship was to take place automatically
upon the evader's departure from the country, without any procedures
at all, the statute was deemed to violate not only the sixth amendment's
jury trial provision but the fifth amendment's provision for indictment
and notice.
In Mendoza, two cases were consolidated for decision, each with an
extensive history. In one, Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, a dual-national
of the United States and Mexico had gone to Mexico during World
War II to evade the draft. Returning after the war, he pleaded guilty in
federal court to evading the draft. Afterward, the Government sought
to deport him as an alien, contending that his departure from the
country to avoid military service had automatically stripped him of
American citizenship. Mendoza exhausted his administrative remedies
and then asked for a judicial declaration that he remained a citizen on
the ground that Congress did not have power to extinguish citizenship
for draft evasion. After the district and circuit courts refused this relief,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
. The Court vacated judgment and remanded the case to the district
court for reconsideration in the light of the newly decided Trop v.
Dules,60 where the Court had held that Congress lacked power to
denationalize a citizen convicted of desertion in wartime. The district
57 361 U.S. 278 (1960). Clark again for the majority held that the case was governed
by Reid. He stressed the lack of administrative necessity, adverting to the small number of such civilian employees and the possibility of requiring such employees to
submit to military jurisdiction as a condition of employment. Frankfurter and Harlan,
grandly consistent, concurred in result because the case was capital. Whitaker and
Stewart dissented, arguing that an employee by status was in matters of discipline more
closely connected to the service than were dependents.
58 361 U.S. 281 (1960). Clark again for the majority treated the case like Singleton;
a capital-non-capital distinction could not stand. Frankfurter and Harlan, as expected,
dissented because the case was non-capital and the balance of interests shifted accordingly. Whitaker and Stewart again dissented for the reasons given about an employee's
status in Grisham.
59 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
60 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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court then held that Congress lacked power to denationalize Mendoza.
On appeal, the Supreme Court again remanded for the district court's
determination of a minor question of collateral estoppel. On the second
remand, there appeared the first glimmer of the procedural issue which
was eventually to dominate the case. The district court now found
another constitutional defect in the statute: it was an "essentially penal"
statute and therefore the administrative proceedings it provided did not
afford Mendoza "procedural due process."' 61
The case decided with Mendoza was Rusk v. Cort. 62 During the Korean
conflict, Cort had remained in Europe in spite of orders to report to a
draft board in Massachusetts. Later his application for a return passport
was denied on the ground that he had forfeited his citizenship by draft
evasion. Remaining in Europe, Cort sought a judicial declaration that
he was still a citizen. A three-judge district court granted this relief,
holding that Congress did not have power to enact this denationalization
statute. That court perceived "no substantial difference between the
constitutional issue in the Trop case and the one facing us." 63 In contrast
to the district court's decision in Mendoza, the district court here did
not find that the statute denied due process. Its holding was limited to
the substantive question decided in Trop: that Congress lacked power
to enact the denationalization statute.
The Trop case, which controlled both lower court decisions to be
reviewed in Mendoza, had aroused keen interest. The Court had divided
into three opinions and many doctrines without producing a majority
opinion. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices Black, Douglas,
and Whitaker, contended that Congress did not have power to take away
citizenship under any circumstances and that, even if it did, this exercise
would constitute "cruel and unusual punishment" for desertion. Mr.
Justice Brennan concurred in the result on the ground that denationalization may be employed only for special regulatory purposes absent in
the case of desertion. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, for the rest of the Court,
dissented, arguing that denationalization was not technically punishment,
let alone cruel and unusual punishment, and that its employment was
reasonably related to the war power.
Interest in Trop was keen also because the result seemed to contradict
the Court's holding in Perez v. Brownell,64 decided the same day. There,
the Court upheld five to four a provision denationalizing citizens who
61 Judgment at 192 F. Supp. 1 (1961) (opinion unreported).
62 369 U.S. 367 (1960), the same litigation, dealt with a question of the availability
of declaratory judgments under the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act.
63 Sub nom. Cort v. Herter, 187 F. Supp. 683, 687 (1960).
64 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
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voted in foreign elections. Only Mr. Justice Brennan found a way to
distinguish between desertion and foreign voting; he alone voted with
the winning side in both Trop and Perez. The two cases created considerable uncertainty, but surely Mendoza would bring a clarification of the
Court's position on involuntary denationalization.
Thus, Mr. Justice Goldberg's majority opinion in Mendoza was
greeted with surprise:
We have come to the conclusion that there is a basic question
in the present cases, the answer to which obviates a choice here
between the powers of Congress and the constitutional guarantee
of citizenship. That issue is whether the statutes here, which
automatically-without prior court or administrative proceedings-impose forfeiture of citizenship, are essentially penal in
character, and consequently here deprived the appellees of their
citizenship without due process of law and without according
them the rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, including notice, confrontation, compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses, trial by jury, and assistance of counsel.6 5
The.Court conceded that the existing provisions for administrative
and judicial review of denationalization "after the fact" may satisfy due
process. But if the statute is penal, said the Court, more than due process
is required. All the criminal provisions of the fifth and sixth amendments are called into play, including the criminal jury trial. 66 The penal
nature of the statute was demonstrated by expressions of congressional
intent, though the Court was satisfied that other criteria for punitiveness
developed in ex post facto cases67 would also be met. The Court under65 372 US. 144, 163-64 (1963). This proposition is repeated three more times: "We
hold §§ 401(j) and 439(a)(10) invalid because in them Congress has plainly employed
the sanction of deprivation of nationality as a punishment-for the offense of leaving

or remaining outside the country to evade military service-without affording the
procedural safeguards guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments." 372 U.S. at
165-66 (Emphasis added.) "[T]he legislative history and judicial expression with respect
to every congressional enactment relating to the provisions in question dating back to
1865 establish that forfeiture of citizenship is a penalty for the act of leaving or staying
outside the country to avoid the draft. This being so, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
mandate that this punishment cannot be imposed without a prior criminal trial and
all its incidents. . . . If the sanction these sections impose is punishment, and it
plainly is, the procedural safeguards required as incidents of a criminal prosecution
are lacking. We need go no further." 372 U.S. at 167 (Emphasis added.) "We conclude,
for the reasons stated, that §§ 401(j) and 439(a)(10) are punitive and as such cannot
constitutionally stand, lacking as they do, the procedural safeguards which the Constitution commands.... What we hold is only that, in keeping with this cherished
tradition [of the Magna Carta] punishment cannot be imposed 'without due process
of law.'" 372 U.S. at 186 (Emphasis added.)
66 Id. at 167.
67 Id. at 167-69.

1963

CRIMINAL JURY TRIALS

took no sustained discussion of the virtues of juries but merely alluded to
an abiding principle dating back to Magna Carta.08
The decision in Mendoza confirms the impression that the Court is
moving away -from the traditional understanding of the sixth amendment. While the court-martial cases showed a growing regard for the
jury and a rejection of traditional decisions, the cases could be viewed as
close ones even within the hodge-podge outline of the traditional cases.
The offenses were felonies, and thus the defendants were entitled by
tradition to be tried by jury. The sanctions, death and imprisonment,
were those traditionally associated with the punishment of crime. The
question was narrow and traditional: whether these citizens were so
closely related to the service that a court-martial could take criminal
jurisdiction.
Although the Court through the years had never articulated a general
theory of the jury requirement, one fact appeared from the old cases.
Sanctions like denationalization, which were not customary in punishing
crime, could be enforced without a jury trial.09 Since the Mendoza
court held that denationalization now required a jury trial, juries for
other non-criminal sanctions may logically be reconsidered. In light of
the Court's high regard for jury trials, 70 it seems likely that the expansion will be dramatic.
It may be objected that Mendoza will have little effect on sixth amendment doctrine.71 After all, the opinion was a surprising result of a clash
over substantive issues. Seven members of the Court joined in opinions
that reached the substantive question-Congress' power to denationalize.
Only the Chief Justice joined wholeheartedly in Mr. Justice Goldberg's
procedural disposition of the case. Yet the Chief Justice himself stated
emphatically in Trop and in his Perez dissent that Congress lacked power
to denationalize. Presumably these views had not changed, so the Chief
Justice's refusal to join in the concurrences that reach the substantive
issue was probably a matter of tactics.72
1s Id.

at 186.

69 See cases cited in notes 12-19 supra.
70 This regard appears not only in the court-martial cases, but in the civil cases cited
note 27 supra. Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (summary procedure invalid
to deny state tax exemption to subversive); Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436,
447-48 (1957) (dissenting opinion, Brennan, J.) (jury required in obscenity proceedings).
11 In Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964), Mendoza is cited as if relevant to the
substantive issue of Congress' power to denationalize. See Apetheker v. Rusk, 378 U.S.
500 (1964); Comment, 32 U. CHI. L. R.v. 290 (1965); The Supreme Court, 1963 Term,
78 HARv. L. REv. 143, 187 (1964).
72 For example, Goldberg might have gone over to the dissenters if Warren had left
Goldberg's opinion devoid of wholehearted support. More likely, Warren was trying

to be courteous.
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If so, the Court was divided four against four on the substantive issue.
Goldberg's was the key vote. Why he did not reach the substantive issue
can only be a matter of speculation. 7S But if only one justice felt strongly
about the majority opinion, its future influence on sixth amendment
doctrine would be questionable.
However, doubts about the influence of Mendoza are reduced because
of its employment in Barnett v. United States.7 4 The Governor of
Mississippi had demanded a'jury trial on a charge of criminal contempt
for disobeying Court of Appeals orders to admit a Negro to the University of Mississippi. A majority of the Court, in an interlocutory appeal,
denied this demand, since by tradition criminal contempts could be
punished summarily.
But significant cracks now appeared in that tradition. A dissent by the
author of Mendoza, Mr. Justice Goldberg, stated that criminal contempts
were really part of the petty crimes exception to the sixth amendment
-a dubious piece of history. 75 A leading case had suggested that petty
crimes which are punished more severely in modern times than previously should thereby lose their petty character and require jury trials. 76
In light of a trend to punish contempts with unprecedented severity,
Mr. Justice Goldberg concluded that serious, "non-trivial" contempts,
like Barnett's, required a jury trial.
Goldberg employed Mendoza in two connections: first, to establish
that criminal contempts are penal in the sense the term was used in
Mendoza, and second, to rebut the contention that needs of judicial
administration justified dispensing with the jury. The Justice quoted
himself:
73 In Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964), Goldberg joined the majority on the
substantive issue that a naturalized citizen could not constitutionally be denaturalized
for staying at length in her country of origin. This vote indicates that Goldberg is
willing to strike down citizenship statutes. So Goldberg's opinion in Mendoza might
have been an attempt at judicial restraint. That hypothesis is questionable, since the
substantive issue that will be presented if the statute is appropriately amended is
identical to that in Trop. As Mr. Justice Jackson has said, judicial restraint need not
consist of "technical doctrines for postponing inevitable decisions." JAcKsON, THE

STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY,

quoted in

FREUND, CONSTrTUTIONAL

LAw, 108 (1954).

Perhaps Goldberg felt, as in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963),
that procedural protections are vital not only to the individual but to the Court as a
way to avoid difficult substantive questions.
74 See note 7 supra. Mendoza was also relied on by counsel in Telephone News System, Inc. v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 220 F. Supp. 621 (1963), where a jury trial was sought
before telephone disconnection for illegal use. Discussed in text accompanying note 122,
infra.
75 See Teift, Barnett v. United States: 'Twas a Wondrous Victory, 1964 SUPREME
COURT REvIEw 123. See generally Frankfurter and Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and
the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REv. 917 (1926).
76 District of Columbia v. Clawans, 800 U.S. 617 (1937), discussed supra note 26.
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The imperative necessity for safeguarding [our cherished
liberties] under the gravest of emergencies has existed throughout our constitutional history, for it is then, under the pressing
exigencies of crises, that there is the greatest temptation to diswhich, it is
pense with fundamental constitutional guarantees
77
feared, will inhibit governmental action.
Mr. Justice Goldberg's dissent, joined in by the Chief Justice and
Mr. Justice Douglas, was dearly intended to carry forward the expansive
spirit of his Mendoza opinion. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting separately,
also advocated a jury, but under a different constitutional theory.
Moreover, at least two members of the majority accepted Goldberg's
premise that severe punishment for contempt requires a jury trial. A
footnote stated: "some members of the Court are of the view that without regard to the seriousness of the offense, punishment by summary
trial without a jury would be constitutionally limited to that penalty
provided for petty offenses." 78 While Goldberg would have required
juries whenever the contempt was serious, a pre-trial determination, the
footnote view would require juries whenever the penalty was severe,
necessarily a post-trial determination. Thus no objection to summary
trial could validly be raised at the outset, as Governor Barnett tried to
do, but a penalty in excess of a "petty" level would apparently be
remitted if summarily imposed. If this half-loaf is acceptable to the
three justices represented by Goldberg's dissent, they may collaborate
with the majority justices responsible for the footnote. By limiting summary power in contempt, this new majority would take another step
along the trial blazed by Mendoza and the court-martial cases. This
prospect of further movement reaffirms the need for doctrinal guidance.
III.
In formulating a theory for the jury requirement it is essential to
know what purposes are thought to be served by the criminal jury trial.
The court-martial cases were long on praise for the jury but short on
analysis. What analysis could be found was flimsy. The jury, it was said,
is "bbtter" than specialists at determining complicated issues. 7 9 The jury
is more impartial than specialists like military officers 80 The jury
resists the "importunities of judges" and "prevailing hysteria and
prejudices." 8' When it does not, the independent judges, whose impor77

376 U.S. 681, 760 (1964).

78 Id. at 695.
79 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18-19 (1955).
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
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tunities juries are so good at resisting, are there to reverse the conviction.82 The jury tries the defendant before his "neighbors and equals."8' 3
The jury is a barrier to governmental arbitrariness.8 4
Similar observations in legal literatur.e have been advanced and
attacked in the "fascinating and bitter" debate over the competence of
the jury.8 5 That debate goes on, in part because both sides prefer value
judgments to empirical evidence and in part because empirical evidence
is inconclusive. So it is important to note that the Court's observations
are at best partial or undemonstrated truths; at worst they are contradictory or simply wrong. That juries resist popular hysteria or judicial
influence is a partial truth. The history of free speech and race relations
shows it is not a whole truth.8 6 That juries are competent to try complicated issues is an undemonstrated assertion.8 7
That the jury opposes governmental arbitrariness is an internally
contradictory assertion. The jury may resist arbitrary government in
the sense that it can refuse to enforce harsh laws.88 But the same lawdispensing function frees the jury to refuse to enforce a good law to the
letter where the particular result is harsh. The outcome of similar cases
thus varies from defendant to defendant and from jury to jury in a
way that contradicts our notion of a rational and even-handed system.
aThis unevenness is the essence of one form of arbitrary government.
That juries try a man before his neighbors and equals is an assertion
which is simply wrong. The defendant is not likely to be tried before
his neighbors, because cities are large and faceless; he is not always
tried before his equals, because educated persons usually fall in occupations excluded from jury service.8 9
The weakness of argument in support of juries does not make a case
for abolishing the criminal jury. The virtues of a jury are strong enough
to justify its continued use where it already exists. But no clear mandate
of morals or policy supports the transposition of the criminal jury to
82 Id.

at 22-23.

83 Reid v. Covert, 854 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1957).
84 Id. at 36-37.
85 ZEISEL & KALVEN, THE JURY, THE JUDGE, AND THE CRIMINAL CASE ch. 1 (to be
published 1965).
86 Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 886,
414 (1954).
87 See WILLiAMS, THE PROOF oF GUILT 286-43 (1958); HOLMES, Law in Science and
Science in Law in COLLECrED LEGAL PAmERs 287-88 (1920). Compare DicEY, LAw
AND TaM CONSTruTION 894 (9th ed. 1948).
88 DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 160-61 (1956) (The Jury as a Safeguard Against Repugnant
Law).
89 Williams, op. cit. supra note 88, at 286-48; BRoEDER, op. cit. supra note 86, at
397, 400. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, § 4 (1985) (Illinois jury exemptions).
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new fields of law. These other fields must afford due process, 9° which
assures notice, hearing, and possibly other clearly beneficial protections
like right to counsel.91 It is unclear what juries would add.
Thus, the Court's movement to extend the jury trial requirement is
apparently derived from an ill-defined impulse to protect individuals
from unfair governmental action. The ambiguity of jury policy should
inspire caution in this movement.
Mendoza suggests one way of formulating a general theory: when the
statute is "penal," it may not be enforced without a jury trial. If "penal"
is taken at its dictionary meaning-to impose a disability for crime or
wrongdoing-this statement makes a sensible beginning. What draws
attention to the need for procedural protection is the Government's
attempt to take action against an individual in consequence of his
wrongdoing. 92 Thus, penal in this sense is a proper threshold word.
But the use of the word "penal" can lead to major complications.
"Penal" as a constitutional characterization of statutes has been used
primarily as one pole of a "penal-regulatory" distinction which has
been prominent in ex post facto and bill of attainder cases since Cummings v. Missouri.93 The majority opinion in Mendoza probably understands "penal" as part of this distinction, and Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent
clearly does. 94 The Court has used the distinction to ascertain whether a
statute imposing a disability retrospectively violates the ex post facto or
90 The fifth amendment requirement of due process might provide various sixth
amendment protections even though the circumstances would -not bring the sixth
amendment as a whole into play. For example, an administrative "fair hearing" might
in some instances require right to counsel, or other sixth amendment protections like
compulsory process for favorable witnesses or right to confront hostile witnesses. United
States ex rel. Castro-Louizon v. Zimmerman, 94 F. Supp. 22, 25-26 (E.D. Pa. 1950), cited
approvingly in I DAvis, ADMINmATIv LAW § 8.10, at 557-58 (1958); cf. Barresse v.
Ryon, 189 F.Supp. 449, 452 (1960) (counsel required in deportation on statutory
grounds). But see In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
91 "Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by
counsel is by far the most pervasive, for it affects his ability to assert any other rights
he may have." Schaefer, Federalismand State CriminalProcedure,70 HARv. L. REV. 1, 8
(1956).
92 In certain penal proceedings a jury trial has been sought on the basis of the
seventh amendment. In the old cases where sanctions were outside the traditional
criminal sphere, the Government was treated as merely another private party and jury
trial claims under the seventh amendment were allowed if the action was at law, e.g.,
Union Ins. Co. v. United States, 73 U.S. 759 (1867), and denied if the suit was in equity
or otherwise not at law, e.g., Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9 (1913). It is suggested
that penal proceedings brought by the Government should be considered initially if
not exclusively as sixth amendment cases.
93 71 U.S. 277 (1866). For a thorough discussion of the origins of the penal-regulatory
distinction and its relation to substantive due process, see Comment, 32 U. Cm. L. REv.
290 (1965).
94 372 U.S. at 213.
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bill of attainder clauses. If the statute aims solely to punish or deter
behavior, it is invalid, but if the statute serves a broader regulatory
purpose it is sustainable. In Trop the Chief Justice put a complicated
matter as simply as possible:
If the statute imposes a disability for the purposes of punishment-that is, to reprimand the wrongdoers, to deter others,
etc.-it has been considered penal. But a statute has been considered non-penal if it imposes a disability, not to punish,
but to accomplish some other legitimate governmental purpose.
The Court has recognized that any statute decreeing some adversity as a consequence of certain conduct may have both a penal
and a non-penal effect. The controlling nature of such statutes
normally depends on the evident purpose of the legislature.
The point may be illustrated by the situation of an ordinary
felon. A person who commits a bank robbery, for instance, loses
his right to liberty and also his right to vote. If, in the exercise
of the power to protect banks, both sanctions were imposed for
the purpose of punishing bank robbers, the statutes authorizing
both disabilities would be penal. But because the purpose of the
latter statute is to designate a reasonable ground of eligibility
for voting, this law is sustained as a non-penal exercise of the
power to regulate the franchise.9 5
Employing the penal-regulatory distinction is a way to resolve sixth
amendment cases, but it has substantial drawbacks. First, if the purpose
of the jury is to protect the individual, he needs that procedural protection whether or not the statute affecting him is imbued with a broader
regulatory purpose. Second, the distinction has its primary use in the
ex post facto cases, to determine whether a statute should be permitted
to have a retroactive effect. For instance, the voting statute in Warren's
example would be permitted to apply to those who robbed banks before
its enactment because it exists to regulate elections, while a statute decreeing imprisonment for bank robbers could not be applied to those who
robbed banks before its enactment because it has a penal purpose. But
the policy issues involved in determining whether a statute should have
retroactive effect may be quite remote from policy questions about requiring a jury trial. Thus, one might term a voting provision "regulatory" when deciding whether those who robbed before its enactment
may be disenfranchised and yet term the provision "penal," when
deciding whether conviction by jury is required to disenfranchise them.
Because of the discrepant policies, the ex post facto cases provide misleading analogies. Third, a conclusion that a statute is regulatory would
bar a jury trial even when jury trials would not impair the regulatory
95 356 U.S. at 96-97.
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process. Yet the importance of protecting that regulatory process was
probably a major reason for labelling the statute regulatory and thereby
allowing Congress to "regulate conduct free from restrictions that pertain
to legislation in the field technically described as criminal justice."9 6 A
final drawback is the difficulty of deciding whether the controlling purpose of a statute is penal or regulatory. The manifold criteria used by
the Court are sometimes contradictory because most statutes imposing
punishment have regulatory purposes as well; the object of a statute
punishing bank robberies, for example, is to protect federal banks as
well as to discomfit bank robbers. As an upshot, the debate about char7
acterization is likely to be sterile and artificial, as it was in MendozaP
becoming ultimately a battle over conclusory categories while the real
reasons for decision go unspoken. These real reasons, such as the impairment of vital regulatory aims, will be discussed later.
Another formulation would posit that juries are required when a
civil disability is used as a means for punishing behavior already forbidden and punished as criminal. The additional non-criminal disability
often embodies a legislative subterfuge to punish without juries crimes
that ordinarily have jury trials. Requiring a jury, then, is simply a
matter of not being misled by labels. 98
An example of this sort of looking past labels occurred in Lipke v.
9
Lederer.P
There, Congress had imposed a special tax on sales of liquor
that already were criminally proscribed under the Volstead Act. Concluding that the purpose of the tax was to punish liquor violators and
not merely to raise revenue, the Court held that Congress must have
intended the penalty to be enforced only after a criminal jury trial,
which was constitutionally required.
While prevention of legislative subterfuge should be taken into
account, the additional punishment rationale would be an inadequate
foundation for a general theory of the sixth amendment jury trial
requirement.100 It could not explain the use of juries in cases that are
96 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, at 125 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
97 372 U.S. at 167-84, 190-91, 213-15.
98 "How simple would be the tasks, of constitutional adjudication and of law generally if specific problems could be solved by inspection of the labels pasted on themi"
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94 (1958).
99 259 U.S. 557 (1922). Cf. United States v. LaFranca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931). But cf.
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
100 An important idea sparking the expansion of the sixth amendment is that legislatures have a broad selection of sanctions to punish wrongdoing. Accordingly, a general

theory should postulate that the constitutional right of trial by jury should not depend
solely on the legislature's choice of sanctions.
Possibly all the Court held in Mendoza was that denationalization could not be
imposed in addition to criminal sanctions to punished draft evasion since denationaliza-
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punished only by traditional criminal means. Even if it were used only
as an explanation for expanding the scope of application of the amendment, the results would be too fortuitous. If the behavior which is
punished by both criminal and non-criminal means should by legislation
cease to be a crime, the non-criminal sanction under this theory could
be imposed without a jury. Yet there might be continuing reasons for
providing a jury trial despite the fortuitous removal of the criminal
sanction.
So far, it seems clear that an acceptable general theory should treat
the imposition of penalties-in the sense of disabilities for wrongdoingas the threshold for requiring jury trials, but should reject the elaborate
penal-regulatory distinction. It should also prohibit legislative subterfuge which punishes crime without a jury trial, by resort to non-criminal
sanctions.
But not all penalties trouble the court; it is the severe penalty that
evokes the impulse for a jury trial. Denationalization in Mendoza is
called "the drastic, the truly terrifying remedy."'u 0 The Court characterizes American citizenship as "one of the most valuable rights in the
world" and stresses that its deprivation has "grave practical consequences, . . . 'not the loss of specific rights . . . but the loss of a com., "102
munity willing and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever ...
Past cases on citizenship brought forth similar expressions of deep
concern.' 03 So too, an unprecedented severity of punishment for contempt, ranging to three years imprisonment, led the Barnett minority
to suggest that all serious criminal contempts be tried by jury and led
the majority to suggest that contempts tried summarily could not be
10 4
punished severely.
The severity of a penalty could serve as the sole criterion for the
availability of sixth amendment juries. The test would be simple-no
tion did not have an alternative regulatory purpose. "Our conclusion from the legislative and judicial history is, therefore, that Congress in these sections decreed an additional punishment for the crime of draft avoidance in the special category of cases
wherein the evader leaves the country. It cannot do this without providing the safeguards which must attend a criminal prosecution." 372 U.S. at 184 (citing Lipke v.
Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922), and United States v. LaFranca, supra note 99). See also
id. at 170 n.30. But Mr. Justice Goldberg stated four times (see note 65 and accompanying text) the broader holding that all penalties require jury trials and Justices
Brennan and Stewart accept that proposition as the holding. 372 U.S. at 199, 206-07.
101 372 U.S. at 188.

Id. at 160-61.
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
(1958) (dissenting opinion); Nowak
v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122
104 United States v. Barnett, 376
102
103

101-02 (1958); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64-65
v. United States, 356 U.S. 660 (1958); Schneiderman
(1943).
U.S. 681, 695, 751-52 (1964).
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severe penal sanctions may be imposed without a criminal jury trialthough it would trample the traditional configurations beyond recognition and involve mass overrulings.105 The job of choosing and applying
criteria to determine the requisite severity would be difficult, but no
more taxing than deciding whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.
Deportation and denaturalization have already been characterized as
severe in Court decisions.106 Juvenile incarceration, loss of right to pursue
a livelihood, heavy tax or administrative penalties and other disabilities
might be found severe enough to warrant jury trials.
But were severity the exclusive touchstone, great damage might be
done to the ability of government to sustain itself through revenues
and to carry out programs of public concern. If tax penalties for failure
to file were deemed severe, jury trials would be required for their
assessment and the consequences would be devastating. In a recent year
delinquent filings for which penalties could be imposed numbered one
and one-third million. The Commissioner proceeded against nearly one
million taxpayers. In contrast, only 7,000 criminal cases of all sorts
were instigated by IRS.1 07 Making jury trials available for one million
assessments would nullify the few sanctions that make self-assessment
effective and thus strike at the heart of our voluntary tax system. Other
examples of impairment of administration are equally apparent. 108
A general theory should take account of the impact of jury trials on
effective governmental administration. 109 No doubt absolute rights
granted by the Constitution should not be sacrificed for administrative
expediency, but the right to a jury trial in areas that border the criminal
law cannot fairly be termed absolute, if indeed any right can. 110 The
right exists, most poignantly, only insofar as the Court says it does; history and precedent stand firmly against it and policy offers little justification. A sense of caution and judicial propriety ought to temper the
Court's zeal for protecting the individual where that zeal has such unsure
foundations.
105 For cases that might require overruling, see notes 12-19 supra.

106 Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660 (1958) (denaturalization); Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1944) (deportation); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S.
118 (1943); Fong Yue Ting. v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893) (dissenting
opinion).
107 COauM'R OF INTERNAL REVENUE, ANNUAL REPORT 35, 40 (1961).
108 "The interposition of the courts in the appraisement of importations, would
involve the collection of the revenues in inextricable confusion and embarrassment."
Bartlett v. Kane, 57 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1853). Similarly, effective military discipline
depends in large measure upon court-martial proceedings.
109 Cf. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1964).
110 Compare Mr. Justice Black in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957), with Address
by Dean Griswold, Absolute Is in the Dark, Leary Lecture, University of Utah Law

School 14, 20 (1963).
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The Court itself has at times studied the impact on administration
when jury trials replace existing procedures."'. Thus, in Toth, the Court
concluded:
It is impossible to think that the discipline of the Army is going
to be disrupted, its morale impaired, or its orderly processes
disturbed, by giving ex-servicemen the benefit of a civilian court
trial when they are actually civilians. Army discipline will not
be improved by court-martialing rather than trying by jury some
civilian ex-soldier who has been separated from the service for
months, years or perhaps decades. 1 2
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the result of Reid v. Covert put
it this way:
We must weigh all the factors involved in these cases in order to
decide whether tiese women dependents are so closely related
to what Congress may allowably deem essential for the effective
"Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces" that
they may be subjected to court-martial jurisdiction in these
capital cases, when the consequence is loss of the protections
13
afforded by Article III and the fifth and sixth amendments."
In Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton and its companion cases,
Mr. Justice Clark removed dependents and civilian employees from
court-martial jurisdiction, in part because the number of crimes generated
from those classes was small, and, in the case of employees, because the
services could solve the problem of discipline by making submission to
1 4
court-martial jurisdiction a condition of employment.
On the basis of considerable analysis, Mr. Justice Goldberg stressed in
Mendoza that "our holding today does not frustrate the effective handling
of the problem of draft evaders who leave the United States.""15
In Barnett, the majority showed an inclination to expand the jury trial
to severely punished contempts, but refused to provide jury trials in all
contempt cases because that step was felt to impair effective judicial
administration. The Court summarized its feelings by quoting from an old
Mississippi case:
The power to fine and imprison for contempt, from the earliest
history of jurisprudence, has been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of a court, without which it could no more
exist than without a judge.. ..A court without the power effecII But see Reid v. Covert, supra note 104, at 14.
112 350 U.S. at 22.
1"3 354 U.S. at 44 (Emphasis added).
314 361 U.S. 284, 246-47, 278, 281 (1960). See notes 56-58 supra.
"15 372 U.S. at 184-85.
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tually to protect itself against the assaults of the lawless, or to
enforce its orders, judgments, or decrees against the recusant
parties before it, would be a disgrace to the legislation, and a
stigma upon the age which invented it."16
Even Mr. Justice Black, in dissent, agreed that imprisonment for so-called
civil contempt is permissible to secure compliance with a court order
17
because of the need for "immediate action.""
If the Court accepts responsibility to consider a broad range of interests
an appropriate theory for criminal jury trials might be worded as follows:
The sixth amendment provides for criminal jury trials in all
cases where the government imposes severe sanctions that punish
wrongdoing except where juries would gravely impair effective
administration.
Such a theory would direct the Court's attention to the following issues:
(1) What sorts and degrees of sanctions should be considered severe? Certainly the old restriction of the sixth amendment to death, imprisonment and fines would be rejected. Moreover, sanctions do not always
have the same effect in different circumstances; intelligent distinctions
might be made, for example, between deportation of a thirty-year resident
and deportation of a wet-back caught a mile inside the border, or between
revocation and suspension of licenses. (2) What advantages do existing
procedures have for the individual and the government? For example,
juvenile proceedings are supposed to benefit the juvenile and the government because of privacy, intimacy and greater chance for rehabilitation.
License revocation proceedings often require expertise concerning legal
ethics, medical techniques, or the properties of radio waves. Assessment
of revenue penalties by revenue collectors aids the government in speed
and cost. (3) What impact on effective administration would result from
replacing present procedures with jury trials? In the case of tax, the
impact would clearly be unacceptable."18 In the case of juvenile proceedings, courts would have to estimate whether existing procedures are
actually accomplishing the administrative purpose of keeping juveniles
out of the criminal system. If not, there is little harm done in requiring
jury trials. In the case of license revocation, courts would have to guess
in each instance how the jury requirement would affect governmental or
professional supervision of the licensed profession. (4) Is the present procedure unsatisfactory for reasons that could be remedied without imposing jury trials? For example, deportation and denaturalization have
11" 376 U.S. at 699-700, quoting Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss. 331, 341-42 (1858).
117 376 U.S. at 728 n.6.
118 See text accompanying note 107.
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recently been held to require not only notice, hearing, and right to counsel, but also a clear and convincing quantum of proof by the government. 119 Or again objection to the lack of independence of courts-martial
might be satisfied by a civilian court even though it did not use a jury.2 0
(5) Is the sanction employed.solely as an additional punishment for
crime? If a legislative subterfuge is suspected, the judicial response is
likely to be a jury trial requirement. This response seems appropriate;
to prevent such a subterfuge, the presumption of need for a jury in these
cases ought to be raised even if the sanction standing alone without coexisting criminal penalties would not have been grave enough to warrant
the presumption. In case the sanction is severe, its use as an additional
punishment would merely strengthen the presumption.
If Mendoza were analyzed in accordance with this approach the result
probably would be the same but the reasons would be different. First, the
severity of denationalization would not merely make the case important,
but would establish a presumption that denationalization could not be
imposed without a jury trial. Second, greater emphasis might be placed
on the existence of criminal sanctions for punishing draft evasion. If
denationalization had no purpose other than to punish draft evasion, it
would be treated as an illegitimate subterfuge to punish crime without
the protection of a jury trial. The presumption in favor of a jury would
thus be strengthened.
Furthermore, the impact of the jury trial on the administration of the
armed forces would have to be scrutinized even more deliberately than
it was. The sensible conclusion-that those who stay abroad to avoid
trial satisfy the purpose of denationalization since self-imposed exile bars
them from enjoying the fruits of a victory which others won-would have
made clear that the presumption for jury trials had not been rebutted.
But other possibilities would also need careful consideration. It might
be asked whether the denationalization statute was objectionable primarily because it lacked a jury trial or rather because the initial determination of denationalization was made without notice, without hearing,
and by administrative officials in interested departments. In the latter
case, a statute that cured these defects might be acceptable, even if it did
not provide for a jury trial.
Analyzed this way, the Barnett result might still be correct. Let us assume, as the minority did, that punishment for contempt has become
severe. If, as the majority states, the summary adjudication of out of
court contempts goes to the core of a court's ability to administer justice,
119 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1944); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S.
118 (1943); cf. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129 (1958).
120 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 87-88 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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then punishment of even greater severity might not require a jury trial.
In addition, if summary punishment of out of court contempts were not
thought to outweigh severe sentences, other kinds of contempt still might
be punishable summarily because of their greater significance for judicial
21
administration.
Finally, it may be helpful to apply this theory to a perplexing lower
court case dealing with a telephone disconnection which was ordered by
the Justice Department because of alleged illegal use. In Telephone News
System, Inc. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.'2 2 the telephone customer
sought an injunction against discontinuance of service by Bell. Bell had
given notice of impending disconnection pursuant to an order of the
Justice Department which later intervened in the injunction proceeding.
The governing statute provided that such orders could be given when
an appropriate law enforcement agency thought that the facilities were
used for illegal gambling. Here, the customer was receiving horse race
results from a national news service and disseminating the results by
telephone recordings, a use of the phone which violated an Illinois gambling statute. The customer alleged in part that the federal statute
violated his rights under the fifth and sixth amendments, citing Kennedy
v. Mendoza-Martinez.
The three-judge district court applied the test used in Mendoza and
found that the statute was not penal but regulatory since it aimed to
prevent crime, not to punish it. One judge in concurring could not
suppress doubt:
[W]here the forfeiture of property will be fatal to the business
life of the party involved and substantially greater and more
severe than the maximum punishment which could have been
imposed in a direct criminal proceeding, labelling it preventive
and non-penal is a sophistry which hardly warrants the abrogation of the Constitutional protections which are the keystones of
American criminal justice. 123
Under the approach suggested in this comment a jury trial would prob121

Contempts might be classified in terms of their significance for judicial adminis-

tration. Perhaps the need for summary proceedings in civil contempt is the greatest,
since they allow great variation in the sorts of affirmative action the court can success-

fully order. Next on the scale of necessity might come contempt in court, since
decorum in the courtroom is closely tied to giving the parties due process of law.
Criminal contempt out of court would come last since the harm of such disobedience
is arguably no greater than when legislation is violated. Furthermore, civil contempt
might be viewed as less severe than criminal contempt, although in theory imprisonment can be perpetual, since the term is not fixed by law but only by the stubbornness
of the victim.
122 220 F.Supp. 621 (N.D. I1. 1963).
123 id. at 643.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

ably be required. The sanction is penal in the common sense of the
word: a governmentally imposed disability for crime or wrongdoing. It
can fairly be termed a severe sanction for the reasons mentioned by
the concurring judge, although the severity is obviously not so great as
that of denationalization. The presumption that a jury trial is needed
can probably be established. Also there would be no hesitation in calling
the statute sanctioning disconnection a legislative subterfuge to punish
crime without the traditional criminal safeguards. For the assigned regulatory purpose of preventing crime is no different from the purpose
of anti-gambling statutes that impose traditional sanctions of fine and
imprisonment. The subterfuge would strengthen the presumption of
need for a jury, or if disconnection were not considered severe, would
assist in raising the presumption.
On the other hand, it appears that administration would not be gravely
affected by requiring a jury. The sanction does not arise from the pursuit
of some important regulatory objective such as tax collection, licensing,
124
of
or even the rates and conditions of utility service. The number
telephone "bookie joints" cannot be large enough to require simplified
procedures. Furthermore, resisting an injunction may cost the government even more money and time than an orderly criminal prosecution.
Since replacing the present procedure appears to incur few disadvantages,
the presumption would seem unrebutted.
IV.
Cases such as Telephone News will test the Supreme Court's ingenuity
in devising a harmonious solution to the criminal jury trial question.
The comfortable formulas which formerly restricted access to juries
stand rejected by the court-martial cases, Mendoza, and Barnett. But
the Court's strong, if questionable, impulse to extend the right to
juries has yet to be supplemented by constitutional guidelines. This comment has sought to identify the variety of interests-governmental and
individual-that the Court should consider in fashioning these guidelines.
124

See Kinsella v. United States ex rel, Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960).

